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1. Barbers and Sets
Here is a well-known puzzle: Say there is a village with a 
barber. Some (male) villagers shave themselves; others are 
shaved by the barber. In fact, the barber shaves all and only 
those who don’t shave themselves. Who shaves the barber?
This is of course a trick question: The answer is that 
there cannot be such a village. If every villager is such that 
the barber shaves him if and only if he does not shave 
himself, then this must also hold for the barber: the barber 
must shave himself if and only if he does not shave him-
self. But that is a contradiction.
A similar puzzle arises from the notion of a set, the 
standard notion of a collection in mathematics. Consider 
the set of sets which are not members of themselves. Call 
it the Russell set, after Bertrand Russell, who came up with 
the argument.1 Unpacking the description, this is the set 
R such that for all sets x, x is a member of R just in case x 
is not a member of x. If this holds for all sets, then it must 
hold for R. So R is a member of R just in case R is not a 
member of R. But that is again a contradiction.
Standard set theories in mathematics respond to 
Russell’s argument just as we did to the barber puzzle: 
They conclude that there cannot be such a thing as the set 
of sets which are not members of themselves. Various sto-
ries have been told to motivate this. A popular one holds 
that sets are constructed in a never-ending series of sta-
ges: At first, there are no sets. To this, we add all the sets 
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whose members are only non-sets. Then we add the sets 
whose members are the non-sets and the sets added at the 
first stage. And so on: at each stage, we add the sets whose 
members are non-sets or sets constructed previously. No 
set contains itself, but we never form the set of all sets not 
containing themselves, because we never form the set of 
all sets: there is no last stage – we always continue adding 
more sets. While the stages and the process of adding may 
be somewhat mysterious, the resulting theory of sets turns 
out to work well for many mathematical purposes.2
2. Properties and Propositions
Russell’s argument can also be formulated for properties: 
consider the property of being a property which does not 
have itself (as one of its properties). Call this the Russell 
property. As before, this leads to a contradiction if we 
consider whether the Russell property has itself: since the 
Russell property is the property of being a property which 
does not have itself, the Russell property has the Russell 
property just in case it is a property which does not have 
itself. Another contradiction. And as with our barber and 
the Russell set, we could conclude that there is therefore 
no such thing. But that does not sit well with some of the 
uses we want to make of properties in philosophy.
One such use is in the philosophy of language. Names, 
like “Socrates”, refer to things: “Socrates” refers to Socrates. 
Predicates, like “is snub-nosed”, express properties: “is 
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snub-nosed” expresses the property of being snub-nosed. 
Sentences express propositions: “Socrates is snub-nosed” 
expresses the proposition that Socrates is snub-nosed. And 
we can conclude this last observation from the earlier two: 
If a predicate expresses a property and a name refers to a 
thing, then the sentence formed by applying the predi-
cate to the name expresses the proposition that the thing 
has the property. In general, whatever phrase we compose 
from words in grammatical ways, we can compose what 
these words express in analogous ways to obtain what the 
phrase expresses.
That, at least, are rudiments of a plausible theory of 
how languages like English work. But they lead to trouble 
with the Russell property: “being a property which does 
not have itself ” certainly seems to be a phrase composed 
grammatically from meaningful words. How, then, could 
it fail to express a property, as it must if we want to hold 
that there is no Russell property?
Many theories in linguistics and philosophy therefore 
respond to Russell’s argument for properties in a different 
way. That way sets aside, to a degree, our intuitive notion 
of a property, and looks at the role this notion plays in 
theorizing about language. Consider “Possibly, Socrates is 
snub-nosed”. This attributes possibility to the proposition 
that Socrates is snub-nosed. Possibility therefore seems to 
be some kind of property. But “Possibly, Socrates” is un-
grammatical. This string of words tries to attribute pos-
sibility to Socrates, but fails to express a proposition. A 
reason is not hard to find: while it makes sense to think of 
possibility as a property of propositions, it makes no sense 
to think of it as a property of individuals. Consider now 
the expression “is snub-nosed is snub-nosed”. This is again 
ungrammatical. It tries to attribute a property of individu-
als to a property, and fails.
A picture emerges: The entities which we express with 
our words divide into categories which correspond to the 
grammatical categories of these words, and the ways in 
which we can combine these entities correspond to the 
ways in which we can combine these words. Just as a pre-
dicate can only compose with a name to form a sentence, 
the property it expresses can only be had by a thing. And 
we must distinguish between different kinds of properties: 
predicates like “snub-nosed”, which compose with names 
to form sentences, express properties of individuals, but 
words like “possibly”, which compose with sentences to 
form sentences, express properties of propositions.
The problem with the property of being a property 
which does not have itself is thus a kind of category con-
fusion. For example, consider properties of things, like be-
ing snub-nosed. Just as “is snub-nosed is snub-nosed” is 
ungrammatical, it makes no sense to ask whether being 
snub-nosed is snub-nosed: not because properties don’t 
have noses, but because a property of things is not the 
kind of property that a property of things could have – 
properties of properties of things are in a different cate-
gory than properties of things. The fact that the English 
“a property which does not have itself ” is still grammatical 
is thus a sort of defect of English. Logicians and linguists 
have therefore worked out artificial languages in which 
words are assigned strict categories, governing the ways 
in which they can be combined. The categories are often 
called “types”, and the resulting systems “type theories” 
(Frege 1879).3
Type theories are useful in the systematic study of lan-
guage. But they are also useful in metaphysics: if things, 
propositions, and different kinds of properties separate 
into a rigid hierarchy of “types”, then these type-distinc-
tions are well-worth making when theorizing about what 
things, propositions and properties are like in very general 
respects, as we do in metaphysics.
3. Structure
What are things, propositions and properties like, in very 
general respects? Consider propositions. One way of shar-
pening the question is to ask what it takes for two sen-
tences to express the same proposition. Is the proposition 
that Socrates is snub-nosed the proposition that Aristotle 
is sitting? We’re inclined to think not. Whenever we have 
two simple predications – sentences composed of a single 
predicate and a single name – we’re inclined to think that 
the two sentences can only express the same proposition 
if their predicates express the same property and their na-
mes refer to the same things. In general, it seems plausible 
that two sentences can only express the same proposition 
if they have the same grammatical structure, and any word 
of the first sentence expresses the same as the word in 
the corresponding position in the second sentence. Call 
this the “structured proposition view”, since it holds that 
propositions inherit the structure of the sentences expres-
sing them. Surprisingly, we can show that this view is 
inconsistent!4
The argument is in some ways similar to Russell’s ar-
gument against the existence of the set of non-self-mem-
bered sets. In fact, it was also discovered by Russell (1903, 
Appendix B), to be rediscovered later by John Myhill 
(1958), which is why it is sometimes called the ‘Russell-
Myhill argument’.5
Take an arbitrary proposition, say the proposition that 
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2 + 2 = 4. Consider the following property of propositions:
To be a stone-thrower is to be a proposition which attri-
butes to 2 + 2 = 4 some property which it itself lacks.6
So a proposition p is a stone-thrower just in case there is 
some property of propositions such that p doesn’t have it, 
and p is the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 has it. For example, 
the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is distinct from itself is 
a stone-thrower, since there is a property of propositions 
– namely being a self-distinct proposition – which it at-
tributes to 2 + 2 = 4 but doesn’t have itself.
Now let the Russell proposition be the proposition 
which says that 2 + 2 = 4 is a stone-thrower. We will show 
that there is some property of propositions distinct from 
being a stone thrower, such that the proposition that 2 
+ 2 = 4 has that property is the same as the proposition 
that 2 + 2 = 4 is a stone-thrower. Since the two properties 
are distinct but the resulting propositions are the same, 
the structured proposition view must be false. This is the 
argument:
We first argue that the Russell proposition is a stone-
thrower, by deriving a contradiction from the assump-
tion that it isn’t. So assume that the Russell proposi-
tion is no stone-thrower. Then there may not be any 
property which it attributes to 2 + 2 = 4 but lacks it-
self. But since it attributes to 2 + 2 = 4 being a stone-
thrower, it may not itself lack the property of being a 
stone-thrower. Therefore it must be a stone-thrower, 
contradicting our assumption that it isn’t.
So the Russell proposition is a stone-thrower. Thus it 
attributes to 2 + 2 = 4 some property F which it itself 
lacks. But since the Russell proposition has the pro-
perty of being a stone-thrower, F must be distinct from 
being a stone-thrower. Thus the Russell proposition, 
the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is a stone-thrower, is also 
the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is F, for some property F 
distinct from being a stone-thrower. And that is what 
we needed to show.
Note that all the properties appealed to in this argument 
are properties of propositions, and are only ever attributed 
to propositions. The distinctions between different kinds 
of properties which we used to argue that there is no such 
thing as the Russell property – described as the property of 
properties which don’t have themselves – cannot be used 
to argue that there is no such thing as the Russell propo-
sition. The argument also doesn’t rely on any ambiguity 
of English: we can carry out the argument in formal type 
theories used by linguists and philosophers which are de-
monstrably consistent.
What does this mean? One may take it to show that 
something went wrong with the story we developed above 
about the entities expressed by phrases and the different 
types into which they fall. Maybe we went astray when 
we derived these types from English grammar but then 
criticized English for not distinguishing between them 
rigorously enough. Maybe. But maybe not. Maybe the 
Russell-Myhill argument just shows something interesting 
and surprising. That a purely formal argument would 
establish a surprising conclusion is no reason to think that 
something has gone wrong: You might have thought that 
all infinite sets are of equal size. They are not.7 You might 
have thought that you can write a computer program 
which outputs all and only the true arithmetic sentences 
in predicate logic. You can’t.8 You might have thought that 
a geometrical ball cannot be separated into a finite number 
of segments which can be reassembled into two balls of the 
same radius as the original. It can be done.9 And so on.
4. Necessity
So, what if propositions are not structured? A general 
way of thinking about the relation between sentences and 
propositions is in terms of how many of the features of 
sentences are reflected in the propositions they express. 
If a feature of sentences is reflected in propositions, then 
two sentences differing in this feature will express different 
propositions; if not, they may express the same proposi-
tion. Thus, the more features of sentences are reflected in 
propositions, the more finely propositions are individua-
ted, or, as it is sometimes put, the more fine-grained pro-
positions are. The view that propositions are structured in 
the sense of reflecting the structure of the sentences expres-
sing them is therefore a view attributing to propositions 
a high degree of fineness of grain. The conclusion of the 
Russell-Myhill argument thus puts a bound on how finely 
propositions may be individuated.
Let’s consider the other direction: are there plausible 
bounds on how coarsely propositions may be individua-
ted? The most extreme view in this direction – the most 
coarse-grained view of propositions – is presumably the 
view that there are exactly two propositions: the True and 
the False. This is a radical view, and it might strike one 
as absurd: Can’t I, one might reason, believe the proposi-
tion that 2 + 2 = 4 without believing the proposition that 
there are Higgs bosons, even though both propositions are 
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true? But, as Gottlob Frege already observed (1892b), such 
attributions have to be treated with care.10 The fact that 
some citizens of the USA are opposed to Obamacare but 
not opposed to the Affordable Care Act does not show that 
Obamacare is distinct from the Affordable Care Act.11 As 
examples like this demonstrate, the truth of ascriptions of 
belief and opposition, along with may other similar inten-
tional states, is not only a matter of the propositions and 
things that are said to be believed or opposed themselves, 
but also a matter of how we refer to them. It might thus be 
that the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is the proposition that 
there are Higgs bosons, even though someone believes that 
2 + 2 = 4 without believing that there are Higgs bosons.
Nevertheless, many contemporary philosophers believe 
that propositions are more finely individuated than truth-
values. Many think that there are distinct truths and dis-
tinct falsehoods. One reason for this is due to Saul Kripke’s 
work on necessity (1980 [1972]). Some truths, such as 2 + 
2 = 4, are necessary – they could not have been false. Other 
truths, such as the fact that I live in Oslo, are not necessary 
– they could have been false. Kripke can be understood as 
arguing that such necessity ascriptions are a matter of what 
is being represented, not how it is being represented. Key in 
this argument is his claim that on his way of using the term, 
“necessary” does not express anything like “can be known 
by pure reasoning” (sometimes called “being a priori”): I 
may be able to know by pure reasoning that Obamacare 
is Obamacare, but not that Obamacare is the Affordable 
Care Act; nevertheless, the proposition that Obamacare is 
Obamacare is plausibly the proposition that Obamacare is 
the Affordable Care Act. This is not so in the case of neces-
sity: to say that Obamacare is necessarily a certain way, just 
is to say that the Affordable Care Act is necessarily that way.
On the basis of such considerations, it is now widely 
held that sentences S and T only express the same propo-
sition if it is necessary that S just in case T. This gives us a 
way of arguing that there are infinitely many propositions: 
Take any distinct natural numbers n and m. There could 
have been exactly n donkeys, in which case there would 
not have been exactly m donkeys. So it is not the case that 
necessarily, there are exactly n donkeys just in case there are 
exactly m donkeys. Thus for any distinct natural numbers 
n and m, the proposition that there are exactly n donkeys 
is distinct from the proposition that there are exactly m 
donkeys. Since there are infinitely many natural numbers, 
there are infinitely many propositions. Just as the Russell-
Myhill argument puts an upper bound on how finely pro-
positions may be individuated, Kripke’s metaphysical no-
tion of necessity puts a lower bound on it.
5. Logical-Metaphysical Explorations
The two bounds on how finely propositions may be indi-
viduated leave much to be settled. Consider the question 
whether every proposition p is identical to its conjunction 
with itself. Claiming that p must always be the same as p 
and p is consistent with our lower bound on how finely 
propositions are individuated, since it is not possible for p 
to be the case without p and p being the case, or vice versa. 
Likewise, claiming that some p is distinct from p and p is 
consistent with our upper bound on how finely proposi-
tions are individuated, since the claim in no way implies 
the full view of structured propositions which the Russell-
Myhill argument showed to be untenable. So: Is it true or 
false?
There are many such questions, and similar questions 
arise for properties; it is far from obvious how to answer 
them. For those who take propositions and properties to 
be important constituents of reality, the study of which is 
the business of metaphysics, the following thus emerges as 
a central question of metaphysics: How finely are propo-
sitions and properties individuated? Or, as the title of this 
article puts it: How fine-grained is reality?12 Although the 
arguments and ideas which I have used to motivate this qu-
estion have been widely discussed in philosophy for close 
to half a century, the question has rarely been addressed 
head on. Many philosophers have either used type theory 
but shied away from attributing any serious metaphysical 
significance to it, or worked on the metaphysics of proposi-
tions and properties but shied away from using type theory 
to articulate it.
The sketch of the Russell-Myhill argument given here 
makes it clear that any attempt to answer the question has 
to be formal, and must be developed rigorously to ensure 
consistency. The pitfalls of attitude ascriptions in making 
judgements about the distinctness of propositions make it 
clear that we must use our best theories in the philosophy 
of language to avoid confusing what is being represented 
with what is doing the representing. And finally, the im-
pact of Kripke’s considerations on necessity makes it clear 
that we must appeal to distinctly metaphysical considera-
tions to decide between competing views.
Investigating the fineness of grain of propositions and 
properties is thus a difficult task, which requires combi-
ning state-of-the-art research in logic, the philosophy of 
language and metaphysics. But it will be worth our effort: 
Advances on these issues offer glimpses into the funda-
mental structure of reality.13 A vast landscape of views lies 
between the two bounds laid out here, most of which is 
untouched by the human mind, waiting to be explored.
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NOTES
1 Russell discovered the argument in 1901 as a way of deriving a 
contradiction in a formal system developed by Gottlob Frege. He 
communicated it to Frege in a letter from 1902; their correspondence 
can be found in van Heijenoort (1967). The argument was discovered 
independently by Ernst Zermelo around the same time (Irvine and 
Deutsch 2016).
2 This is often called the ‘iterative conception of set’ (Boolos 1971). It 
can be used to motivate different formal systems; the most widely used 
is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice, abbreviated 
‘ZFC’. Enderton (1977) gives a rigorous but accessible introduction to 
this set theory.
3 The basic idea of such type distinctions is already implicit in the first 
formulation of predicate logic, Frege (1879), and worked out more 
fully in in Frege (1891, 1892a). Note that these predate Russell’s argu-
ment: Frege’s type distinctions were based on the functions of words 
of different grammatical categories, rather than being introduced as 
a response to the argument. Why then did Russell’s argument apply 
to Frege’s system? Frege’s main project was to develop a purely logical 
theory of arithmetic, set out in Frege (1884) and worked out in Frege 
(1893/1903). (Translations of Frege’s works are available, e.g., Frege 
(1953) and Frege (1980).) As part of this theory, Frege defended a prin-
ciple he called Basic Law V, which roughly says that for every property, 
there is a unique corresponding thing, its extension. A variation on 
the Russell set argument uses Basic Law V to derive a contradiction in 
Frege’s system. Type distinctions continued to play an influential role in 
logic, e.g. in Whitehead and Russell (1910–1913) and Church (1940). 
They were central in Richard Montague’s pioneering work in formal 
semantics (Montague 1974), and continue to be widely appealed to in 
linguistics (Heim and Kratzer 1998).
4 Admittedly, I am simplifying things a little. Okay, a lot. As many have 
argued, we have good reason to complicate the story about language 
I have told, and associate an expression not with a single content (a 
proposition, property etc.) but several contents of different kinds. 
This means that it is somewhat more difficult to see what to conclude 
from the argument described below. I discuss this in detail in Fritz 
(unpublished), where I argue that for the notions of propositions and 
properties which are central for metaphysics, the conclusions I draw 
here apply.
5 The version I’m giving here is a variant taken from recent discussion, 
in Dorr (2016) and Goodman (forthcoming).
6 I owe the term ‘stone-thrower’ to Nathan Salmon, via Cian Dorr.
7 This was proven by Georg Cantor, published in 1891, and is often just 
called ‘Cantor’s Theorem’.
8 Since there are infinitely many such sentences, ‘outputting all’ does 
not mean that the program has to write infinitely many sentences in a 
finite length of time. What is required is that for each such sentence, 
there is some time after which it has been produced. The result was 
proven by Kurt Gödel, published in 1931, and usually called his ‘First 
Incompleteness Theorem’.
9 This was proven by Stefan Banach and Alfred Tarski, published in 
1924, and is often called the ‘Banach-Tarski Paradox.’
10 The view that there are precisely two propositions is in fact relatively 
naturally attributed to Frege.
11 This example was suggested to me by Clas Weber.
12 This way of formulating the question is taken from Goodman 
(forthcoming).
13 I believe that advances on these issues will also be useful for much 
more down-to-earth purposes. But it would take more than a paragraph 
or two to explain this, and so it will have to wait for another occasion.
PETER FRITZ
